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 Death, Permanence and Current Practice in Donation after Circulatory Death 
 
Before the acceptance of neurological criteria for human death in the late 1960s and 1970s 
leading to Donation after Brain Death (DBD), early organ donation from deceased patients can 
be characterised as proceeding according to current protocols for Donation after Circulatory 
Death (DCD).1 In DCD, death is diagnosed using cardio-respiratory criteria, satisfaction of which 
confirms that the circulation of the patient has ceased. Whilst these are the same criteria that 
doctors use to determine whether or not death has occurred in most other environments, in 
the context of organ donation there is pressure to pronounce death as soon as possible. The 
reason for this is that the cessation of circulation causes warm ischaemic damage to organs, 
meaning that their suitability for transplantation rapidly falls (within 20 minutes, for example, in 
the liver).  
 
Successful DCD requires the shortest period from circulatory cessation to organ recovery. 
National guidelines therefore recommend a minimum of 2-20 minutes (eg USA, 2 minutes; UK, 
5 minutes; Italy, 20 minutes) wait following cardio-respiratory arrest before doctors should 
declare death.2 In the context of DCD the determination of death raises a particular ethical 
issue and a potential conflict of interests between the dying patient and the organ recipient. 
Thus, both for clinical and ethical reasons, DBD became the preferred approach to organ 
retrieval with DCD becoming so neglected as to be something of a rarity. Nevertheless, because 
of the worldwide shortage of transplant organs and the fact that patients, families and 
professionals began advocating for the development and adoption of protocols for DCD, it has 
seen an international resurgence over the last two decades.3  
 
At present, up to 10% of worldwide deceased donations result from DCD.4 In the UK the 
predominant type of DCD is controlled DCD which accounts for 40 per cent of all deceased 
organ donation.5 Controlled DCD typically involves a mechanically ventilated patient in 
intensive care with overwhelming single organ failure, usually the brain. With the family’s 
agreement, a decision is made to withdraw life-sustaining treatment. If the patient is medically 
suitable, consent for organ donation is sought from the family, taking into account any wish 
expressed on organ donation registers. If consent to donation is gained a surgical retrieval team 
is mobilised to the donating hospital and withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment only 
commences once the surgical team is prepared in theatre and recipients for the organs have 
been identified. This type of DCD is considered to be ‘controlled’ because there is some ability 
to predict and plan for imminent circulatory cessation. Upon the withdrawal of life-sustaining 
treatment, if cardio-respiratory arrest occurs within a few hours (3 hours in the UK), DCD may 
be possible once death has been diagnosed.  
 Philosophical Criticism 
 
Concern has been expressed in the medical and philosophical literature that in DCD the donor 
‘may not be dead’ at the time of organ recovery, thus violating the dead donor rule.6 7 8 9 The 
dead donor rule (‘DDR’), prohibits organ recovery before death. The concern is that if organ 
recovery commences at just a few minutes after cardio-respiratory arrest, than we cannot 
know that the circulatory cessation is irreversible. In some cases, we might still be able to 
restart the heart by cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (CPR) or other human action. 
 
That death should be irreversible appears self-evident and is written into many statutes. For 
example, in the USA the Uniform Determination of Death Act 1981 (UDDA), provides that ‘An 
individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory 
functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain 
stem, is dead’.  
 
One response to this criticism has been to claim ‘irreversible’ means ‘permanent’ and to adopt 
a normative definition of irreversibility.10 11It might be biologically true that five minutes after 
cardio-respiratory arrest attempts at CPR might be successful but patients on a DCD pathway 
have a Do Not Attempt Cardio-Pulmonary Resuscitation Order (DNA CPR) and therefore there is 
no intention, and indeed it is ethically prohibited, to attempt this action. Since CPR is the only 
way the circulation could be restarted, and CPR is not going to occur, cessation is permanent so 
the patient can be declared dead. 
 
Critics retort that death is not normative but biological.  It is not enough for circulatory-
respiratory function to have ceased permanently – it needs to be biologically incapable of 
restarting.  
 
Nevertheless, the term ‘irreversible’ remains ambiguous, even on a purely biological account. 12 
It can mean either or both of two things: 
 
a) not capable of being resuscitated by CPR or other human action; or  
b) not capable of spontaneous auto-resuscitation. 
 
Following cardio-respiratory arrest the heart might restart as a result of human efforts, such as 
CPR, or it may do so of its own accord (auto-resuscitation). It is to prevent the possibility of 
auto-resuscitation that national guidelines recommend a minimum wait time for doctors before 
declaring death. The five minute standard was originally proposed by Eugene Bouchut in 1846 
as a means of preventing premature burials.13 Modern evidence suggests that waiting as little 
as 2 minutes may be sufficient to prevent the possibility of auto-resuscitation following the 
withdrawal of life sustaining treatment,14 although in situations of failed CPR waiting for a 
longer period (5-7 minutes) may be warranted.15  
 
Regardless, the point we are making is that auto-resuscitation is tied to a biological definition of 
irreversibility. Furthermore, if both auto-resuscitation and resuscitation by human action must 
be impossible before death can be declared, it remains unclear how long doctors should wait. 
Should the time of death’s irreversibility be tied to the time at which the human action of CPR - 
or other resuscitative technologies such as extra-corporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO) - 
would fail?16 If so, might we need to readjust the wait time every time there is a medical 
breakthrough? At present there are a wide range of times - from minutes to ‘several hours’ - 
before we can be certain that an individual can no longer be returned to life by human 
intervention.14,17,18 Finally, consider the hopes of those involved in post-mortem cryogenics. At 
minimum it would seem that a biological account of irreversibility is tied to our current 
knowledge and technological abilities.  
 
These facts justify a practical distinction between patients for whom CPR (or other human 
action) is appropriate and those for whom it is not. After waiting for the possibility of auto-
resuscitation to pass, doctors should not need to wait for another, second period of time to 
pass where that period of time is only required in order to rule out the possibility of successful 
CPR.12,16 The circulation has stopped, we know it will not be restored through auto-
resuscitation, and we know that resuscitation by human action is not allowed: so we know all 
we need to know to declare death.16  
 
While this conclusion remains debatable there is no denying that DCD justifies its adherence to 
the dead donor rule only by its satisfaction of death as permanence. We might then consider 
how well the current practice of DCD satisfies the standard of permanence. 
 
Permanence and Typical Controlled DCD 
 
A UK consensus meeting discussed the theoretical possibility that auto-resuscitation could 
occur in a typical controlled DCD, either spontaneously, or from actions that might 
inadvertently mimic CPR (e.g. patient movement during transfer to the operating theatre or 
vigorous intraabdominal organ retrieval that might theoretically compress and restart the 
heart).19 Since the year 2000 there have been over 4000 controlled DCDs in the UK, with no 
published or anecdotal reports of auto-resuscitation occurring using a five minute wait time 
after circulatory cessation.5 Worldwide a similar picture emerges, including in the USA with 
even higher DCD numbers. This suggests that in controlled DCD auto-resuscitation is extremely 
unlikely. 
 
Permanence and Heart DCD 
 
The development of formal protocols for DCD was initially intended to facilitate the 
procurement of kidneys for transplantation, but its use has rapidly been expanded to the 
retrieval of other organs including lung, liver, pancreas and, more recently, hearts. There has 
also been an expansion into other patient populations such as uncontrolled DCD. These special 
circumstances create new challenges in DCD with regard to respecting the dead donor rule. In 
what follows, we shall focus exclusively on DCD heart transplantation, as the newest, and 
perhaps most challenging, development in this field. 
 
Current heart DCD practice uses two main techniques. The first involves placing the heart in an 
organ transport box after removal, where oxygenated blood is perfused to the isolated heart to 
stimulate it to commence contraction. This allows the heart to be assessed and transported in a 
manner that avoids any further damage that would result if it was transported by the 
traditional method – i.e. non-beating in ice. Some have criticised this technique, and heart DCD 
transplantation in general, as it appears to contravene the notion of death as being the 
irreversible and permanent cessation of circulatory function, since the heart regains function.20 
21Indeed, the alternative phraseology for DCD (common in the USA) is Donation after Cardiac 
Death, which appears to suggest a paradox whereby a dead heart becomes alive again. This 
argument seems weak, however, even in the jurisdictions of the criticism. The UDDA confirms 
death as it relates to an individual not their body part and a similar law in Australia states very 
clearly it is ‘irreversible cessation of circulation of blood in a person’s body’.22 Further, as noted 
above, the impossibility of resuscitation by human action is not the applicable standard for 
declaring death in these donors.  
 
The second main technique used for some heart DCD cases in the UK offers a somewhat 
different challenge to the standard of permanence.18 In this technique ECMO is commenced in 
the body of the donor after the declaration of death but the perfusion is regionally isolated to 
all parts of the body except the brain and upper limbs by virtue of a surgical cross clamp placed 
across the arterial vessels emerging from the arch of the aorta.  Once ECMO circulation 
commences, the heart will begin to contract within a few minutes, allowing detailed 
assessment of function, optimisation if required and removal with proposed less warm 
ischaemic damage. As recently argued this is to attempt to respect permanence only as it 
applies to the cerebral circulation (provided the clamp is fully effective in isolating the cerebral 
circulation) not as it applies to the heart and circulation within the rest of the body.23 While this 
defence of permanence might be strong and in keeping with previous efforts10 it does suggest 
that the law in the USA and Australia might need to be modified to allow DCD hearts to be 
recovered. In both jurisdictions a statutory criterion for death is ‘irreversible’ cessation of 
circulation and, using this technique, the circulation is restored artificially in the body. There 
does not seem to be a similar requirement to change the law in the UK where no such statute 
exists. By contrast the various Codes of Practice for declaring death in the UK have since the 
1970s have upheld the view that whatever the mode of its production, either due to intra-
cranial or extra-cranial events, irreversible (perhaps normatively defined) cessation of brain-
stem function represents the stage at which a patient becomes truly dead.24  
 
Conclusion 
 
Donation after Circulatory Death is a success story. It has meant that many thousands of 
patients have been able to donate organs after their death in accordance with their end of life 
wishes. From that altruism many thousands of patients have had their lives saved or otherwise 
benefited. While debated by some, the dead donor rule should remain inviolate in organ 
donation policy. It is therefore important to tackle questions that challenge whether donors are 
really dead at the time of donation.  
 
DCD practice relies on a definition of irreversible cessation of circulatory, respiratory and 
neurological functions that is partly normative. This paper argues that the standard of declaring 
death based on the time at which resuscitative efforts would be futile is not applicable where 
resuscitative efforts are expressly ruled out, so we need only wait for the possibility of auto-
resuscitation to pass. At this point, the heart has stopped, we know it cannot auto-resuscitate, 
and we know that resuscitation by human action (CPR or ECMO) will not be allowed: so we 
know all we need to know to declare death.  
  
Typical controlled DCD satisfies this standard. Special circumstances in DCD require particular 
care, especially to ensure that the cerebral circulation is never restored. For some jurisdictions 
this might require the redrafting of statutes, to make it clear that what is ruled out is restarting 
circulation in the brain. With appropriate safeguards DCD will continue to be safe and 
respectful to all who wish to make this gift after death.  
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